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OUR NATION'S ENERGY AND
RESOURCES-DECISION MAKING IN
CONFLICT
WALLACE

H.

JOHNSON*

Two hundred years ago, on September 26, 1789, Edmund Randolph Jennings became the first Attorney General of the United
States under an appointment by President Washington. It was not
until nearly a century later, however, in the administration of
Ulysses S. Grant, that the Department of Justice was established. At
that time, Amos T. Ackerman became the first Attorney General to
head what was destined to become the world's largest law office.
Over our history, some seventy-six men have served their President and nation in the role of the American equivalent of England's
Minister of Justice. Together with the Secretaries of State, Defense,
and Treasury, these men have formed the inner circle of official
counselors to the country's Chief Executive. Some of these men
earned a lasting place in America's legal history: men like Roger Taney, Edwin M. Stanton, George Wickersham, and Harlan Stone.
Others are remarkably forgotten. The significant fact is that no matter whether a particular Attorney General was acclaimed by his contemporaries or denounced, the Department has emerged with an
honest, able, and compassionate reputation as an administer of
justice.
While I have not made a precise calculation, a casual review of
the cabinets of the forty-one American Presidents seems to show
clearly that there has been a greater turnover among Attorneys General than in any other cabinent position. For example, President
Grant had no fewer than five occupants of the position. There are,
of course, a number of reasons for this phenomenon. President
Washington, in 1794, "promoted" Edmund Randolph to succeed
Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State. Other incumbent Attorneys
General left under less auspicious circumstances, including some of
those of recent and unhappy memory.
During my own tenure with the Department, I was privileged to
serve under seven Attorneys General. When I joined the Depart* Partner, Kutak, Rock & Campbell, Omaha, Neb. B.A., Ohio University; J.D.,
University of Toledo College of Law. Mr. Johnson was a former Chief of the Land
and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice.
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ment in 1965, Nicholas Katzenbach was the Attorney General.
When I left the Department, ten years later, the Attorney General
was Edward Levi. Of course, I am not counting the acting Attorneys
General who, during my tenure, held the office for brief periods of
time.
DECISION MAKING

When I was a Criminal Division prosecutor, decisions seemed
easier and more clear cut. We represented Justice with both a large
and a small "j." We were the "good guys," and those we prosecuted
were the "bad guys." I learned quickly that this view was too naive
and comfortably simplistic. There were no easy decisions that were
absolutely clear cut when I served as Assistant Attorney General.
As you review the case study included in Part II of this article,
you will note that underlying these cases were many policy decisions
which involved the complex problems inherent with difficult issues.
Most of these decisions were controversial, and each had its own advocates. Each presented a difficult decision. How did the Justice Department make decisions concerning its role in these matters?
No decision was made in a vacuum nor exclusively by any one
individual. Whether the client was the Department of Interior as
fiduciary for an Indian tribe, the Army Corp of Engineers, or the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Justice Department's procedure was the same: we would seek the recommendation of our client,
ordinarily presented in writing from the General Counsel of that Department or agency. Of course, there were regular meetings and conversations on a daily basis between the litigating attorney in the
Justice Department and the attorney in the Office of General Counsel for the agency. As questions became ripe for decision, the matter
would first be elevated to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General
and then to the Assistant Attorney General.
In addition, there were weekly briefings from each of the division's section chiefs where case status was discussed. The Deputy
Assistant Attorney General and I met daily to review important
matters. Virtually everything was done in writing, and every attorney had the opportunity to present his views and be heard. On each
of these matters, I met regularly with departmental attorneys and
with attorneys from our client agencies. Occasionally, we would meet
with nonlegal officials of the client agencies, and, in one particular
case, we met regularly with the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency. Each week, I would personally brief the Attorney
General, discuss the status of important litigation and divisional
matters within my discretion, and seek his counsel and direction on
how to proceed. In the case of the Wetlands Policy, Attorney Gen-
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eral Saxbe, the former United States Senator from Ohio, took an
active interest in developing this policy and met with interested officials in various parts of the United States to promote its adoption.
We have all learned that litigators are, by definition, contentious and tend to become emotionally involved in matters they handle. They believe in what they do. In large measure, this attitude
and characteristic qualify them as good advocates. When decisions
are made with which they disagree or which are contrary to the positions they argue for, there is sometimes a charge that "politics"
played a part in the decision. The more visible the issue, the more
likely the charge. It is not easy to accept when one's arguments do
not prevail. I understood this because I often felt the same way, particularly when I was a trial lawyer in the Criminal Division of the
Justice Department. It was hard to accept that my superiors did not
completely agree with the position I wanted the Department to take.
There are those even today who believe politics played a part in the
aggressiveness of the Department of Justice in pursuing environmental enforcement actions against particular litigants.
Of course, in one sense, politics are involved. Politics in a partisan sense is relevant given the relationship among the Department,
the President, and the Congress. Every Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, Solicitor General, and Assistant Attorney General
-

the legal officers of the United States -

is appointed by the

President and confirmed by the Senate.' Each appointee usually appears before the Senate Judiciary Committee for a confirmation
hearing. Regularly, Senators are principal sponsors of candidates for
high-level positions in the Justice Department. Having personally
worked on the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee and with the
Chairman and the Committee's ranking member closely for many
years, I have seen first hand the politics in the appointment process.
Nonetheless, partisan politics never played a part in any decision that I personally made or have heard about subsequent to my
departure from the Justice Department. That is not to say, of
course, that members of Congress do not express opinions to Justice
officials. There are regular channels and procedures established to
be sure that all views are heard and taken into consideration. Having all available information before you makes for much better
decisions.
Partisan politics aside, however, litigation decisions and policy
pronouncements are political in a philosophical sense. For example,
1. See generally Biden, Balancing Law and Politics: Senate Oversight of the
Attorney General Office, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 151 (1990) (discusses the motivating
political factors of the appointment process and considers the Senate's oversight role
at the confirmation stage).
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politics play a role in decisions concerning expanding the authority
of federal agencies into land use control regularly reserved for the
states. These philosophic questions are quite properly the responsibility of the Congress and other administration officials, particularly
domestic policy makers in the White House and at the Office of
Management and Budget. These issues are clearly "political."
There is yet another important distinction concerning the Justice Department. Clearly, one major difference between the United
States Justice Department attorneys and attorneys in private law
firms is in the area of representing clients. I mentioned earlier that
in Lands and Natural Resources we received instructions from our
clients on how to handle litigation. In private practice, of course, if a
client is unhappy with his lawyer and his actions, the client gets a
new lawyer. Conversely, sometimes it's the lawyer who withdraws
from the representation. The Justice Department's authority, however, originates from the Congress and a historic relationship with
the courts. In the government, if a client agency does not like its
lawyer, redress can only come from the Congress. This permanent
relationship can create a real problem for the client agency and its
constitutents because the Judiciary Committees in both houses have
historically been zealous in their protection of the Justice Department's authority. I regularly confronted challenges to the Department's authority on environmental matters and Indian affairs.
Occasionally, charges were made that the Justice Department
was not aggressive enough or that the questions were technical and
required an agency's unique skills and expertise to litigate. The response, of course, was that the litigation matters affected the Judiciary and required uniform policy decisions. The United States must
speak with one voice to the courts. The real question, however, was
who would exercise authority over the development of policy and
enforcement of congressionally established laws and policies. In addition, client agency lawyers were often professionally unfulfilled,
being limited to taking recommendations. Understandably, they
wanted the power and opportunity to follow a litigation matter
through to its conclusion. These issues-client relation issues- were
regulary on my desk and occupied much of my time. These questions were certainly political but not in a partisan sense. What now
follows is a case study which sets forth a few specific examples of the
Justice Department's policy decision making from the context of the
division I served in: the Land and Natural Resources Division.
II.
A.

DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT

The Reserve Mining Case

The Reserve Mining Company mined low-grade iron ore, called
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taconite.2 In 1947, the company received a permit from the State of
Minnesota to discharge the wastes from its processing operations
into Lake Superior. By the early 1970s, 67,000 tons of waste were
discharged daily.'
In 1969, the State of Minnesota and the United States tried unsuccessfully to procure abatement of the discharges through the
Minnesota state courts. In 1972, the United States filed a complaint
in federal court alleging that Reserve Mining's discharge of waste
into Lake Superior violated various sections of the United States
Code as well as the federal common law of public nuisance. The
United States focused on the public health impacts of the discharge
and Reserve Mining's emissions into the ambient air. The United
States maintained that the processing of the taconite resulted in the
discharge into the air and water of mineral fibers substanially identical to asbestos. On the other side of the coin was the fact that the
processing operation employed about 3,000 workers and was central
to the economic livelihood of Silver Bay, Minnesota, and surrounding communities.
Judge Miles Lord was controversial. Our efforts at the Justice
Department focused as much on tempering the Judge's aggressiveness as on "winning" the case, a unique and interesting policy decision. Nevertheless, Judge Lord found that the discharge violated the
federal acts and caused a common-law nuisance." Taking into account the threat to public health and the defendant's "intransigent"
refusal to dispose of the waste by safer alternative means, Judge
Lord enjoined further discharge of the waste, which in effect would
close down the plant.'
In a strongly worded opinion, Judge Lord found that Reserve
Mining's discharge created "a serious health hazard to the people
exposed to it."' Among those people were the entire city of Duluth,
Minnesota, whose residents got their drinking water from Lake Superior. The problem Judge Lord had to overcome was that tests on
deceased Duluth residents showed no asbestosis. Judge Lord was
not willing to wait until contamination "reached alarming proportions."7 The court was "faced with a situation where a commercial
industry [was] daily exposing thousands of people to substantial
quantities of a known human carcinogen.""
2. For a more complete discussion of the facts underlying this matter, see Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 294 Mich. 300, 200 N.W.2d
142 (1972).
3. Id. at 303, 200 N.W.2d at 144.
4. Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974).
5. Id. at 20.
6. Id. at 17.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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The case was appealed to the Eighth Circuit, and the district
court's injunction was stayed pending appeal.' On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the injunction but directed modification of
its terms. Five judges, en banc, found that Reserve Mining's discharges gave rise to a "potential threat" to the public health which
called for an abatement order on "reasonable terms."' The court
also found that the discharges violated federal and state laws. Because no harm to the public health had been shown, however, the
danger was not "imminent." 11 Consequently, the court found that
''no reason exists which requires that Reserve Mining terminate its
12
operations at once.
But this was not the end of the case, as Judge Lord took further
action, including ordering Reserve Mining to pay $100,000 to the
City of Duluth to help the city filter its drinking water.13 The question of who should supervise the water filtration arose upon a motion by the State of Minnesota, joined by Reserve Mining, to require
the Corps of Engineers to continue to provide residents of Duluth
and surrounding communities with supplies of clean drinking water.
The Corps wanted to shift primary responsibility for the filtration
program to the local officials. 4 The Eighth Circuit directed the
Corps to furnish safe drinking water for the Minnesota communities."
Additionally,
the court wanted continued
federal
supervision."
The Eighth Circuit in this same proceeding also entertained a
request to recuse Judge Lord. His most recent abuses had been to
order Reserve Mining to pay $100,000 to the City of Duluth without
due process. The court found that Judge Lord was biased against
Reserve Mining and removed him from the case.1 7 As this case illustrates, often the Justice Department must engage in decision making and find itself confronted with events which involve unique
decisions.
9. Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co., 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974).
10. Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co., 514 F.2d 492, 500 (8th Cir. 1975).
11. Id. at 515.
12. Id.
13. Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co., 529 F.2d 18i, 182 (8th Cir. 1976).
14. Id.
15. Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 21 n.1 (1974).
16. The court wanted continued federal jurisdiction because:
(1) Lake Superior is a body of water under federal jurisdiction;
(2) The pollution affects several states and the health of their inhabitants;
(3) The United States originally entered the controversy to petition for abatement of the nuisance;
(4) The Corps and the EPA's National Water Control Laboratory possess sufficient technical knowledge and equipment; and,
(5) The local government units may lack expertise, personnel and equipment.
Reserve Mining, 529 F.7d at 184.
17. Id. at 188.
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B.

203

Wetlands Protection

The wetlands protection policy that has been developed in the
last two decades is a prime example of the reach government agencies can have in affecting laws and policies in this country. The public interest in long-term ecological and economic productivity often
conflicts with short-term economic gain. The wetlands have been the
subject of this bitter conflict for many years, and the wetlands policy is continually subject to change.
The policy of environmental protection for wetlands was established with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA")
Amendments of 1972."8 The dispute, which initially involved the
Army Corps of Engineers on the one hand, and the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Department of Justice, and numerous environmental groups on the other, concerned the proper scope of federal regulatory jurisdiction over dredge and fill activities throughout
the nation.
The Corps' position was that section 404 of the FWPCA
Amendments did not significantly expand the Corps' traditionally
limited jurisdiction over the depositing of dredged or fill material in
"navigable waters." The Corps' original authority to regulate dredging and filling in navigable waters originated under the River and
Harbors Act of 1899,"9 enacted under Congress' powers to regulate
interstate commerce. The Corps' regulatory jurisdiction under this
Act was limited to activities which took place in "navigable waters."
"Navigable waters" was defined at this time as those waters which
have been in the past, or may be in the future, susceptible to interstate or foreign commerce.
Section 404 of the FWPCA Amendments defines the Corps' fill
jurisdiction so as to cover such projects in "waters of the United
States."2 ° This new definition seemed to include a broader category
of water resources including environmentally critical, nontidal, inland wetlands. However, the Corps was reluctant to accept such a
broad definition.
It was not until the decision in National Resources Defense
Council v. Callaway21 that the court resolved the issue by requiring
the Corps to publish new regulations that would better effectuate
the full statutory mandate of the FWPCA. The result was a compilation of the Corps' final interim regulations which were a dramatic
expansion of the regulatory power of the Corps.
18. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511368 (1982)).
19. 30 Stat. 1151 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1899)).
20. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1899).
21. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
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The scope of the Corps' expanded jurisdiction under the
FWCPA has not been fully defined, but is certainly broader than
ever envisioned. Both the evolution of the expanded regulations and
the case law on this subject seem to suggest that there is not much
room for limiting the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands in the
future.2 2
The section 404 regulations of the FWPCA Amendments have
expanded the Corps' jurisdiction throughout the years and can be
categorized in three separate areas. The three categories are: (1) regulations before July 22, 1982; (2) regulations between July 22, 1982
and October 5, 1984; and, (3) regulations after October 5, 1984.
The regulations before July 22, 1982 were not as broad as regulations that later developed. Discharges of fill were permitted in
such waters as: nontidal rivers, streams and their impoundments, including adjacent wetlands that are located above the headwaters;
and natural lakes, including their adjacent wetlands that are less
than ten acres in surface area that are fed or drained above the
headwaters or that are isolated and not a part of a surface river or
stream.
These discharges were subject to four conditions, 2 and were
also subject to certain "management practices," which set forth administrative criteria.' The regulations before July 22, 1982 also permitted certain categories of fill discharges.2 5 However, these permit22. See Hanson, Damming Agricultural Drainage: The Effect of Wetland Preservation and Federal Regulation on Agricultural Drainage in Minnesota, 13 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 135 (1987); Torres, Wetlands and Agriculture: Environmental Regulation and the Limits of Private Property, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 539 (1986).
23. These conditions were:
(1) that they not threaten an endangered species or its habitat;
(2) that they be free from toxic pollutants (except trace quantities);
(3) that the fill be maintained to prevent erosion; and
(4) that the discharge not occur in a state or federal wild or scenic river system.
33 C.F.R. § 330.5.
24. The regulations before July 22, 1982 contained the following "management
practices":
(1) other practical alternatives should be used to avoid or minimize discharges;
(2) discharges in spawning season should be avoided;
(3) discharges should not impede movement of indigenous aquatic species or
passage of normal high flows;
(4) adverse impacts of flow restriction should be avoided;
(5) discharges in wetlands should be avoided;
(6) heavy equipment working in wetlands should be placed on mats;
(7) discharges into waterfowl nesting areas should be avoided; and
(8) temporary fills should be removed.
33 C.F.R. § 330.6.
25. The permitted fill discharges were:
(1) backfill for utility line crossings;
(2) bank stabilization material, within certain specified limits (less than 500
feet of bank, less than one cubic yard of fill per running foot, not placed in
wetlands or so as to impair water flow into or out of wetlands);
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ted discharges were also subject to certain conditions.2" The District
Engineer of the Corps also had discretionary power to require other
permits not included in the above requirements where there would
be cumulative adverse impacts to the affected waters. If a discharge
was not allowed under the categories above, a permit was required.
The Corps regulations were modified July 22, 1982, and the new
regulations were in effect until October 5, 1984. The significant
changes in the new regulations included the establishment of two
"nationwide permits." The nationwide permits allowed discharges
into "non-tidal rivers, streams and their lakes and impoundments,
including adjacent wetlands that are located above the headwaters,"
and "other non-tidal waters of the United States ...that are not

part of a surface tributary system to interstate waters or navigable
waters of the United States."2" These two provisions were known as
the "headwaters" provisions and the "isolated waters" provisions.
The remaining regulation did not change substantially but one condition was added to the allowed discharges. The new condition required that the discharge not be located near a public water supply
intake.
The Corps explained the limitation on its jurisdiction by stating
the discharges that eliminated the ten-acre size limit were not usually a threat to water quality on the surface tributary system. In
addition, case-by-case regulation of such areas would be a more appropriate role for the states.
Thus, after July 22, 1982 and before the next change in the regulations (October 5, 1984), fills were permitted in streams, lakes and
wetlands above the headwaters of tributary streams and in isolated
(nontributary) waters, regardless of the open water area involved.
The only exception was that the Corps had more discretionary authority in determining which open waters required regulation. In addition, a new list was added of discharges not requiring permits.2"
(3) minor road crossing fills, culverted;
(4) fill incidental to bridges over tidal waters; and
(5) repair of previous fills.
33 C.F.R. § 330.5.
26. These requirements are:
(1) that the discharge not be near a public water supply intake;
(2) that it not occur in areas of concentrated shellfish production;
(3) that it not threaten an endangered species or its habitat;
(4) that it not disrupt the movement of aquatic life indigenous to the water
body;
(5) that it be free of toxic pollutants (except trace quantities);
(6) that the fill be maintained to prevent erosion; and
(7) that the discharge not occur in a state or federal wild and scenic river
system.
33 C.F.R. 323.4-3.
27. 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(a).
28. This list included:
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Any dredging or filling must have a permit if it is part of an
activity where the purpose is to convert an area of the waters of the
United States into a use to which it was not previously subject. A
permit is also needed when the flow for circulation of waters of the
United States may be impaired or the reach of such waters reduced.
"Waters of the United States" was broadly defined in the 1982 regulations to include any waters or wetlands "the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce."20
The 1982 "nationwide permits" appear to have permitted many
more activities than the regulations before July 22, 1982. During
that period of time, the Corps had adopted a much more flexible
approach in regulating the discharge of fill materials in waters of the
United States.
The Corps' regulations were further modified on October 5,
1984 and are still in effect today. This modification was made as a
result of an agreement settling a lawsuit in which various environmental groups alleged that the Corps' regulations did not sufficiently
protect the environment.30 In the settlement, the Corps agreed to
promulgate new regulations acknowledging the EPA guidelines as
mandatory. The regulations also added general policy provisions emphasizing the importance of wetlands."'
The July 22, 1982 provisions permitting discharges into certain
waters and certain categories of discharges were modified. The two
types of discharges authorized in the July 22, 1982 regulations (the
"headwaters" and "isolated waters" provisions) continued but with
some significant changes. First, the phrase "including adjacent wetlands" was added to the isolated waters provision. Second, they were
modified by excepting from the nationwide permit any discharges
"which cause the loss or substantial adverse modification of i0 acres
or more of waters of the United States, including wetlands." These
nationwide permits were also made subject to the eight conditions
and the "best management practices" which already applied to all
other nationwide permits under the July 22, 1982 regulations.
(1) normal farming and ranching but only if part of an "established" operation;
(2) maintenance of existing dikes, etc.;
(3) construction or maintenance of stock ponds or irrigation ditches, or maintenance (but not construction) of drainage ditches;
(4) construction of temporary sedimentation basins without placement of fill
into "waters of the U.S.";
(5) state-approved activities; and
(6) construction or maintenance of farm roads in accordance with Best Management Practices (of which 15 are listed).
33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a).
29. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(3).
30. National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985 (D.D.C. (1983).

31. See Comprehensive Wetlands Protection: One Step Closer to Full Implementation of § 404 of the FWPCA, 5 ENVTL. L. REP. 10099 (1975).
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The list of activities not requiring permits continued basically
unchanged from the July 22, 1982 regulations. Normal farming and
ranching continues to be exempted. Conversion of wetlands to farming or ranching continues not to be exempted.
The courts have also generally construed the jurisdiction of the
Corps over navigable waters very broadly. 2 For example in United
States v. Byrd,3 3 a landowner had engaged in fill projects in an effort
to convert the wetlands bordering a lake on his land into land suitable for residential development. The discharge of fill into this lake
was performed without a state water quality certification or a permit
from the Corps.
After a detailed explanation of the definition of the waters covered in the FWPCA Amendment, the court reviewed congressional
legislative history and determined that Congress intended the term
"navigable waters" to have the broadest possible constitutional interpretation."' Thus, the court concluded that wetlands were within
Congress' regulatory control of navigable waters under the Commerce Clause. 5 Therefore, the regulatory definitions of navigable
waters, promulgated by the Corps, were reasonably related to Congress' purpose under the FWPCA.38
The scope of the waters which fall within the Corps' authority is
not fully defined by the above regulations. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 7 the court upheld the Corps' authority
to regulate the placing of fill material in wetlands. The court also
upheld the regulations which the Corps promulgated to define "wetlands" (essentially, lands that normally support vegetation adapted
for life in saturated soil conditions) at least where those wetlands
are adjacent to open waters. 8 After reviewing the legislative history,
the court expressly held "Congress evidently intended . . . to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable'
'
under the classical understanding of that term."39
In addition, the
court held that wetlands adjacent to such waters were indeed intended to be regulated and that "there is an adequate basis for a
legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters
32. See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
33. 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
34. Id. at 1209. The term "navigable waters" is defined at 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7)(1982) (the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas).
35. Byrd, 609 F.2d at 1210.
36. Id. at 1210-11. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (purpose of water pollution prevention and control is to maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
nation's waters).
37. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
38. Id. at 131. For a definition of wetlands, see 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(7)(b) (1986).
39. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 133.
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under the Act."' 0 Nevertheless, the court in Bayview was careful to
state that its ruling applies only to "wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which the Corps has jurisdiction." The court noted,
"The regulations also cover certain wetlands not necessarily adjacent to other waters.

41

Without belaboring the point, it should be obvious that Congress intended a broad definition of "navigable waters," possibly to
insure that waters potentially capable of carrying pollutants into the
stream of commerce be regulated. The problem with the Corps' regulations are that they simply sweep in too much area and go well
beyond the scope of waters which could even remotely be considered
aspects of the chain of commerce. 2
An example of the far reaching implications of the Corps' extended jurisdiction is in cases dealing with the discharge of fill for
farming practices. In United States v. Huebner,'" defendants had
purchased a 5,000-acre tract, mostly wetland, that had been farmed
intermittently for various crops since the turn of the century. Defendants began to plow and ditch parts of the farm in 1977 and were
ordered by the Corps to cease and desist. Defendants argued that
they were exempt under the provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1) exempting farming operations. The court ruled, however, that the
farming exemption was intended to permit only "narrowly defined
activities ... that cause little or no adverse effects ...[and which do
not] convert more extensive areas of water into dry land .... ""'The

court also found that defendant's activities did not comply with the
"best management practices" of the regulations and that the exemp5
tions therefore did not apply.'

40. Id. at 134.
41. Id. at 135.
42. See Boxer, Every Pond and Puddle-or How Far Can the Army Corps
Stretch the Intent of Congress, 9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 467, 474 (1985).
43. 752 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 1241 (citing legislative history of the Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972).
45. Another case illustrating the point is Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983). In this case, landowners owned about 20,000
acres of forested land in Louisiana. They began to clear it for soybean production.
The Corps issued a cease and desist order and declared part of the area to be wetlands. Private plaintiffs brought suit against the landowner, Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency seeking a judgment that the entire area was a wetlands
area. The district court ordered the Corps to reevaluate its wetlands determination.
One of the arguments from the landowner in Avoyelles was that Congress did not
intend to exercise its power to regulate all discharges affecting interstate commerce.
Id. at 922. The landowner also argued that the activities were exempt as "normal
agricultural activities." Id. at 925. The court rejected both arguments. Specifically,
the court commented on the exemption argument holding that where forest is being
converted to farmland, the exemption is precluded because the exemption only applies to "ongoing agricultural activities." Id. But see Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v.
York, 603 F. Supp. 518 (W.D. La. 1978) (holding the Corps' issuance of a permit to
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These cases illustrate the expansion of our wetlands protection
policy. At no time did we at the Department of Justice envision the
Corps' power to be so broad. In the early stages of the dispute over
the definition of waters covered under the FWCPA Amendments,
the Department of Justice pushed for an expanded definition. However, in setting policy at the time, the long-term effects were not
taken into consideration.
The problems with the expanded jurisdiction of waters regulated by the Corps are most evident in the impact it has on agricultural activities. Although there are exemptions in the statute for
some agricultural activities, the courts seem to have construed the
exemptions very narrowly.
There are numerous indications that it was not the intention of
those of us involved in the decision making process to give the Corps
so much power over wetland areas. First, the legislative history of
the FWPCA indicates that a number of Congressmen feared that
undesirable and extensive federal regulation of agriculture would result from the passage of the FWPCA Amendments. 6
Secondly, because most agricultural activities
by other provisions of the FWPCA,47 there does
reason for them to be included for the discharge
final factor is the cost for the Corps to administer
gram for regulating the discharge of fill material
wetlands.

are not regulated
not seem to be a
of fill material. A
such a broad profor such areas as

With such a broad and undefined interpretation of waters covered in the FWPCA Amendments, it is very difficult for the Corps to
know when to enforce the provisions. In addition, a landowner really
has no way of knowing when he is required to apply for a permit to
discharge fill material in a wetland area.
It seems like a policy that was initially meant to dispense with
harmful discharge of fill material into our environment has also
turned into a policy of zoning of land by the federal government.
Instead of zoning determinations made by the states, the federal
government now has an avenue in which it can make ultimate land
use decisions. For example, if there is construction of certain facilities on a wetlands area, the federal government, through decisions
made by the Corps, has the power to deny such construction by denying a permit for discharge of fill material in the wetlands area. Is
this the result we wanted from our wetlands protection policy? Polclear 5,000 acres of forested bottomland to convert to soybean production was valid
because keeping the area as a wetland is not a "practicable alternative" to increasing
the return on the land by growing soybeans).
46. 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3668.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1948).
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icy decisions made by government agencies have just as great an impact as court rulings. A major example being the wetlands protection policy that has developed in the last two decades.
C.

Indian Litigation Policy

The United States' Native American policy originated from the
European treatment of Indian tribes. The British government dealt
directly with tribes to avoid tumultuous interactions between citizens of the Crown and Native Americans. Similarly, the United
States government, rather than individuals or states, has controlled
relations between Native Americans and other citizens.
The United States gets involved in litigation with Native Americans for two reasons. First, a duty to protect Native American interests exists partly as a result of past unjust actions by the federal
government. The Department of Justice has provided protection of
tribes' land rights since 1879.48 Second, although tribes use and occupy reservation lands, ultimate title to the lands vests in the
United States.
As a member of the Justice Department, dealing with American
Indian matters was particularly difficult because the policy of the
United States was changed regularly. Moreover, conflicts arose
among the divisions within the Interior Department because each
might be pursuing a conflicting policy objective.
When I began my tenure as Assistant Attorney General, all of
these Interior-resource-Indian matters were handled by our attorneys in the same section. On any one day, the same attorney might
be representing the Bureau of Indian Affairs in its role as trustee
and the Bureau of Reclamation at the same time. This was a critical
problem, and the tribes were arguing aggressively for independent
representation outside the Department of Justice or at least representation by the Civil Rights Division. I resolved this conflict by creating an Indian Rights section and isolating the attorneys dealing
with Indian issues from those handling the Department of Interior's
other business. The section has operated efficiently and fairly for the
past fifteen years. Its first chief, Myles Flynt, now serves as Deputy
Assistant Attorney General and remains a distinguished civil servant
and government lawyer. What follows is a case study which illustrates how policy decisions come alive during the course of just one
48. Joint Resolution of March 3, 1879, 20 Stat. 488, superseded by Act of March
1, 1889, 25 Stat. 768 (instructing Attorney General to bring suit to quiet tribal title);
see also 25 U.S.C. §175 (1893). However, courts recognize United States representation of Native Americans as entirely discretionary. Siniscal v. United States, 208 F.2d
406 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. Arizona Sand and Rock Co., 353 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Ariz. 1972).
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piece of litigation.

In 1854, the United States reserved land on the west side of the
Missouri River for the Omaha Indian Tribe."9 Since then, river
movements caused 2,900 acres of the reservation land to shift from
the west side in Nebraska to the east side in Iowa. For at least forty
years, people other than tribal members possessed the land. In 1975,
the Omaha Indian Tribe filed a complaint claiming title to the land.
The first Omaha Indian Tribe ruling was made in May 1977."
Finally, the case appears resolved, because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in May of 1989.1' The initial issue was whether accretion or avulsion caused the land changes. According to Nebraska
law, if the changes were avulsive rather than accretive, the Omaha
Indian Tribe could properly claim the land. The district court's decision was adverse to the tribe and the United States. The district
court determined that the tribe and the United States failed in their
burden to prove they possessed title to the land. 2
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's decision.53 The court decided that §194 of Title 25 of the United States
Code should be applied to the case. Section 194 placed the burden
of proof on the white landowners, because the trial involved a Native American and property rights. The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the Eighth Circuit's decision.5 The Court decided
section
that, although section 194 applies to individual landowners,
55
194 did not apply to the state of Iowa as a defendant.
On remand, the Eighth Circuit decided that the tribe succeeded in its claims for all land except land claimed by the State of
Iowa." The court remanded the case so the district court could consider whether the tribe sustained its burden of proof for the lands
claimed by the State of Iowa.
The district court ordered the entire 2,900 acres quieted in the
Omaha Indian Tribe and the United States.5 The court also ruled
that the tribe could bring an action to recover accretions to tribal
land, even though the United States refused to add that complaint. 8
The court stated that Congress intended by the enactment of 28
U.S.C. §1362 to enable the tribe to sue in federal court to protect its
49. Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 575 F.2d 620, 621 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated
and remanded 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
50. Omaha Indian Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
51. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 109 S. Ct. 2429 (1989).
52. Jackson, 433 F. Supp. at 88.
53. Wilson, 575 F.2d at 651.
54. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
55. Id. at 667-68.
56. Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1980).
57. United States v. Wilson, 523 F. Supp. 874, 897-898 (N.D. Iowa 1981).
58. Id. at 899.
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property rights.5 9

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the district court decision.60 In regard to about 700 acres of land, the
court decided that the tribe must show avulsion caused the movement of lands claimed by the State of Iowa and individual landowners.6 ' On remand, the district court later decided that the tribe did
not meet its burden of proof in respect to the lands claimed by the
State of Iowa and the individual owners. The court ruled the land
quieted in the State of Iowa and the individual owners.6 2
The tribe appealed the decision, and the Eighth Circuit agreed
with the district court that the tribe failed to sustain its burden of
proof.6 " However, the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the government should have quieted title to the trust
lands many years ago. The court believed insufficient evidence existed to show that the tribe experienced a disadvantage as a result of
the timing of the action and to show that the government intentionally avoided instituting the action." As a result, the government
could use escrowed profits from leases of the land to pay for improvements to the lands.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 65 rejecting three separate
appeals by the tribe, private landowners and the State of Iowa. The
tribe contended that two Department of Justice attorneys engaged
in "forced, fraudulent representation" of the tribe during the proceedings.6 6 The validity of the tribe's contention remains unresolved.
However, the fact that the tribe did not succeed in its claims against
the State of Iowa may support the argument that the level of governmental protection given Native Americans from state intrusion is
arguably much lower now than in recent years.
A Senate panel will soon release a report which argues that the
government has failed in its responsibility to Native Americans, although the government spends approximately three billion dollars a
year on Indian programs.6 7 While the policy decisions are often on
subtle matters, at times the process engages the interest of Congress
and its oversight function. 8 It is through this political system of
checks and balances that policy decisions are reviewed to ensure fair
59. Id.
60. United States v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1025 (1984).
61. Wilson, 707 F.2d at 308-09.
62. United States v. Wilson, 578 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (N.D. Iowa 1984).
63. Omaha Indian Tribe v. Jackson, 854 F.2d 1089, 1094 (8th Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 1095.
65. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 109 S. Ct. 2429 (1989).
66. The Omaha World Herald, May 30, 1989, at 13.
67. The Omaha World Herald, June 10, 1989, at 12.
68. See generally Biden, supra note 1.
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administration of justice by government lawyers.
CONCLUSION

I am convinced that as long as individuals make laws and enforce policies, there will be variations in "justice." These variations
can never be eliminated and are best left to the balance of power
that exists among the Judiciary, the Congress, and the Executive. In
my career, I almost always worked with justice officials who were
extremely competent and certainly well-meaning. Of course, some
were better qualified and experienced than others, and there were
different philosophic approaches.
Overall, however, during the twenty-five years I have worked in
and observed the Justice Department and the judicial system, I am
convinced that the past traditions and reputation of the Department
will continue to attract high quality attorneys to its ranks, and experienced and high quality attorneys to its leadership posts. This
will always provide the proper checks and balances in our system
and will ensure the best decisions.
I shall always be grateful for the opportunity to have served in
the Department of Justice. My respect for the Department and my
loyalty to it was enhanced by the professionalism and dedication I
saw in the men and women who worked there. They were the ones
who carried the burden of protecting the ideals and aspirations of a
nation of laws-a burden that sometimes seemed unbearably heavy.
My admiration extends as well to the many nonlegal activities of the
Justice Department: the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Bureau of Prisons; the Marshals Service; and others. It is fitting that
this symposium celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Attorney
General's office. The office and its personel have served this country
well.

